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Fraud is an unfortunate aspect of the technical efficiency 
of the payment system, which is measured by the qual-
ity of its operational performance and cost.1 Fraud de-
grades operational performance and increases cost—
not only for the parties to the transaction(s) whose 
payments are disrupted, but for the payment system 
as a whole. Indeed, any serious consideration of pay-
ments fraud must account not only for the readily mea-
surable business and consumer impacts of such fraud, 
but also for impacts on the performance and cost effi-
ciency of the payment system. 
Today’s panel2 on fraud containment has been asked 
to identify the most common forms of retail payments 
fraud; the most effective fraud reduction tools, espe-
cially those pertaining to real-time payments; and ap-
proaches that payment providers and merchants take 
to balance fraud risk and consumer convenience. In 
taking up the last issue in particular we will attempt 
to provide a broad perspective that addresses the con-
sequences of fraud not only for individual businesses 
and consumers, but for the integrity of the payment 
system as a whole. 
While the focus of the conference is, naturally, on 
the U.S. payment system, it should be noted at the out-
set that the fraud problem is global, affecting many 
national payment systems and cross-border payment 
arrangements. For example, payment system fraud 
poses a threat to the internal market for payments in 
the European Union and is therefore receiving promi-
nent attention in Europe.3 My sense is that the main 
payment system fraud concerns and issues in the U.S. 
and Europe are very similar and that we have a lot to 
learn from each other’s experiences and responses.  
Accordingly, we should consider today’s discussion 
part of a global dialogue about payment system fraud, 
and we should be open to opportunities to be in-
formed by the international debate. This is especially 
so with regard to the public policy responses to the 
fraud problem. 
The members of the panel bring an ideal combi-
nation of informed perspective and practical experience 
to bear on the problem of fraud. We have an informa-
tion security technologist, a banking security practi-
tioner, and a seasoned retail industry lawyer who has 
been concerned with customer data privacy and pro-
tection. Each of the panelists, whom I will introduce 
in a few minutes, will take 15 minutes to present his 
perspectives, and then we look forward to taking your 
questions and engaging in dialogue with you.
I would like to begin with some introductory re-
marks intended to set the stage for the panel discus-
sion. In particular, I want to crystallize the business 
and public policy issues that involve containment of 
retail payments fraud. I will do so by summarizing 
the thinking of practitioners (by which I mean the 
providers and corporate users of payment services) 
and economists about fraud and efforts to contain it. 
The views of these two groups vary somewhat and 
are important because they influence public policy. 
You will understand that my background as a central 
bank economist, and also as a payments product man-
ager and technology manager, has a strong bearing on 
how I cast the issues.
Economists’ view of payments fraud
Payment system economists are principally inter-
ested in the most effective and efficient possible oper-
ation of the payment system. Of course, economists 
also respect the role of markets in delivering efficient 18 1Q/2009, Economic Perspectives
outcomes, and the payment system market is no ex-
ception. From the perspective of economic analysis, 
however, payment systems and markets are thought 
of as special because they entail something called 
“network effects” and “two-sided” services, which 
are characteristic of public goods.4
Payment markets, moreover, may not always 
function like perfect markets because of the presence 
of “externalities,” meaning that the costs and/or bene-
fits associated with payment services are not always 
recognized by the parties to commercial transactions. 
As an example, my decision to use a risky means of 
payment may be a relatively easy one if it imposes costs 
on others and on the payment system, but not so much 
on myself. In addition, the markets may suffer from 
“asymmetrical information,” meaning that the sellers 
and buyers of payment services are not equally well 
informed about the riskiness of a particular payment 
service. For example, as a buyer I may not know as 
much as I would want or need to know about how 
well my personal payment information is secured in 
the service provider’s systems. 
For these reasons, as I will describe later, some 
economists see a natural role for the public authorities 
in helping control payment system fraud. They might 
do so by issuing regulations that specify the amount 
and type of disclosure required for payment service 
security, by enforcing those and other regulations, 
and possibly by facilitating industry-wide practices 
that lead to desired effectiveness and efficiency out-
comes for the payment system. 
The views of economists are often informed by 
observed experience, and accordingly, I would like to 
share with you some lessons learned by practitioners 
who have met the business challenge of delivering ef-
fective, efficient, secure, and well-controlled payment 
services, especially as it pertains to security. They have 
found, first, that security is hard to achieve and ensure, 
and it requires relentless attention. Second, security is 
very expensive to produce and can impose indirect 
but nonetheless very real costs on consumers through 
the “user experience.” Third, cooperation across the 
supply chain is not only desirable but also necessary 
to achieve meaningful outcomes for customers because 
security is “only as strong as the weakest link,” as the 
adage goes. Fourth, certain aspects of technology, and 
security in particular, are moving outside the banks’ 
sphere of core competency, leading to outsourcing as  
a means of staying ahead of the curve; this leads to 
new types of risk that must be managed. Finally, the 
reputational risk associated with providing payment ser-
vices is of greatest consequence to boards of directors of 
banking institutions because the success of the banking 
franchise depends on reputation and trust. Any business 
consideration of fraud containment must start with the 
board of directors and the corporate culture surround-
ing the private market approach to fraud containment.
The Federal Reserve’s role 
A word or two about the Federal Reserve’s oper-
ational responsibilities in the payments marketplace 
will help illustrate that the Fed is in close touch with 
business and operational realities faced by practitioners. 
The Federal Reserve Banks directly provide retail 
payment services, primarily check, electronic check, 
and automated clearinghouse (ACH), for which they 
charge fees that are designed to recover the full costs 
of operation. They also produce retail payment services 
on behalf of the U.S. Department of the Treasury in 
their role as fiscal agents. This includes electronic pay-
ment services in support of the Treasury’s public debt 
and, if I can put it in these terms, accounts receivable 
and payable operations. The Fed thereby indirectly 
interacts with a large proportion of the retail public. 
Moreover, and perhaps especially important in the con-
text of today’s discussion, the Federal Reserve Banks’ 
electronic payment operations are Internet-intensive, 
meaning that the public Internet figures prominently 
in the delivery of their services. 
This brings the reality of public networking and 
protection of customer information very close to home 
for the Federal Reserve Banks. Speaking of close to 
home, this is an opportunity to recognize the leading 
role played by the host of this conference, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago, as the Reserve Bank respon-
sible for the content, quality, security, and bottom line 
financial viability of the Federal Reserve’s electronic 
payments. The Chicago Fed deserves to be recognized 
as the U.S. central bank’s Internet payments pioneer.
An industry perspective of payments fraud 
The current state of thinking by industry practi-
tioners about retail payment system fraud is well rep-
resented by the diverse cross section of participants in 
a 2007 roundtable on the subject sponsored by the 
Federal Reserve Board’s Payments System Policy  
Advisory Committee.5 The roundtable, which includ-
ed representatives of banks, nonbank payment pro-
viders, card companies, and technologists, produced  
a variety of views but also a broad consensus on some 
important points. There was consensus that the current 
level of payments fraud is being effectively managed 
and that organizations must constantly adapt to keep 
pace with criminal activity, technology-driven change, 
and innovation in the payment system. At the same 
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will never be possible to eradicate fraud completely 
and that the never-ending challenge of fraud preven-
tion must balance costs and benefits. 
While the roundtable participants indicated that 
the dollar value of fraud relative to business revenue 
is declining, their business costs of fraud mitigation 
are both substantial and trending upward. An especially 
interesting consensus emerged: The payment instru-
ment that is the principal source of fraud losses on a 
comparative basis is the traditional paper check. We 
should try to validate this observation today and, de-
pending on the outcome, reflect on the implications 
for future fraud containment as reliance on electronic 
payments continues to increase.
The roundtable participants spoke to the challenges 
posed by the Internet as a source of fraud, since it al-
lows fraud that is directed to the domestic payment 
system to originate anywhere in the world. Some took 
a broad view of payments fraud by saying—rightly so 
in my view—that protecting customer information is 
part of the responsibility shouldered by payment pro-
viders. In the end, it was noted that detecting and pre-
venting retail payments fraud requires a holistic approach 
that includes not only designing and producing well-
secured payment services, but also encouraging and 
helping customers to practice good security behaviors. 
The roundtable made three suggestions for improving 
fraud detection and prevention. These are to increase 
1) industry-wide information sharing and collaboration, 
2) use of enhanced authentication technologies, and 
3) adoption of the standards set by the PCI (Payment 
Card Industry) Security Standards Council LLC.6
The consensus reached by the roundtable is sup-
ported by the results of a somewhat earlier survey of 
approximately 100 large nonfinancial firms that ac-
tively use a variety of payment services.7 In the survey, 
each firm identified its most important payment pro-
cessing needs and those needs that are least well met. 
While the firms participating in the survey generally 
responded that controlling fraud is very or critically 
important, a relatively low percentage responded that 
they are dissatisfied with the ability of current payment 
methods to control fraud. Consequently, other payment 
improvements, such as the ability to track transactions, 
emerged as needing higher priority attention than 
fraud containment. 
Public versus private responses to 
payments fraud
The evidence suggests that practitioners are com-
fortable with the current state of fraud control in the 
retail payments marketplace. Their views can be con-
trasted with those of economists who take a public 
policy interest in the payment system. Economists’ 
current thinking about retail payment system fraud is 
somewhat more difficult to discern than that of practi-
tioners because it has a work-in-process quality to it. 
Nonetheless, some recent economic analysis suggests 
that the view of economists is likely to be a bit less 
sanguine than that of the practitioners in the retail 
payment industry. 
There seems to be the sense that market incentives 
and mechanisms per se are not up to the task of con-
taining fraud and possibly other operational risks to a 
degree that optimizes overall payment system effective-
ness and efficiency, and indeed they might not even 
maintain the integrity of the payment system as it con-
tinues to evolve. Two recent economic analyses under-
taken within the central banking community suggest 
that the growing role of third-party, or nonbank, pro-
viders of payment services is a cause for concern and, 
moreover, that the public-good aspects of payment 
systems call for a more active governmental role. Let 
me elaborate briefly on some of the main conclusions 
from these analyses for they are important.
The role of nonbanks
A paper presented at the recent conference on 
nonbanks and risk in retail payments, sponsored 
jointly by the European Central Bank and the Bank  
of England, shows that nonbanks currently play an 
important role, especially in the United States, and 
will play an increasingly important role in a variety 
of retail payment systems worldwide.8 It argues that 
the growing nonbank presence has increased opera-
tional risk, including data security risk and, by exten-
sion, fraud risk. The paper also raises concerns about 
systemic operational disruptions as a consequence of 
concentrating operations among fewer key nonbank 
payment services providers. Finally, the paper speaks 
to the “payment system gatekeeper” role of banks and 
to the inherent difficulties that banks have in fulfilling 
their role while the operational locus shifts to nonbanks. 
I think that it is very useful to measure and high-
light the significant and increasing role of nonbanks 
in the retail payment system. At the same time, how-
ever, I question the conclusion that a more prominent 
operational role for nonbanks automatically increases 
operational risk. Electronic payments are among the 
most technology-intensive financial services. My prac-
tical experience with electronic payments is that the 
pace of change in the technology environment, includ-
ing the technical capabilities that support fraud schemes, 
requires providers to operate on or near the technolo-
gy frontier, especially if they want to stay a step 
ahead of the bad actors who perpetrate fraud. 20 1Q/2009, Economic Perspectives
Staying a step ahead of payments fraud in this en-
vironment is simply not possible for banks to accom-
plish without forming business alliances and partnerships 
that mobilize the needed technology skills. These 
business partnerships more often than not take the 
form of outsourcing to nonbank specialists, which, if 
managed well, act to strengthen the payment system. 
Also, I question whether concentrating the supply of 
sophisticated operational services, at least up to a 
point, necessarily increases operational risk. I think, 
again based on practical experience, that fragmented 
operations poorly performed, or performed below a 
recognized high standard, can be riskier than consoli-
dated operations performed at the highest standard if 
due attention is given to security, business continuity, 
and operational contingency arrangements. Of course, 
operational cost is also a factor in that electronic pro-
cessing exhibits natural economies of scale.
Information-dependent transactions
An additional paper relevant to the topic of fraud 
containment is that by a Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City economist regarding the ability of the private 
sector alone to protect against the risk of identity theft 
and to protect the retail payment system.9 This paper 
focuses on “transactional identity” and “information-
dependent transactions” involving noncash retail pay-
ments. It concludes that because of the problems with 
externalities and asymmetric information, the market-
place will not contain identity theft to an efficient degree; 
and as a result, the integrity and efficiency of the pay-
ment system, which we are to think of as a public good, 
are threatened. The concept of market failure is evoked 
and an active role for public authorities is envisioned 
to ensure the integrity of the payment system. Some 
examples of public policy prescriptions to deal with 
market failure—such as disclosure rules to address 
the asymmetric information problem and laws to clearly 
and comprehensively assign liability to address the 
problem with externalities—are very familiar to us. 
The paper holds out the more intriguing prospect of 
other payment system interventions by public author-
ities along the lines of the Federal Reserve’s lender of 
last resort role in the credit markets or the federal de-
posit insurance. 
This economic analysis seems to be at odds with 
the views of industry practitioners who think that the 
payments fraud challenge, while significant, is within 
the power of the private sector to address. The chal-
lenge, I think, is to evaluate seriously what remains to 
be done in the realm of private sector initiatives to 
protect the integrity of the payment system, not just 
the integrity of individual service offerings. 
Conclusion
As we head into the panel discussion, it will be 
important to keep in mind the apparent differences in 
how practitioners and payment system economists size 
up the problem of fraud, the ways in which it is con-
tained, and the implications for public policy. In taking 
up the issues assigned to us—the most common types 
of payments fraud, the most effective tools to deal with 
these types of fraud, and the costs of containing fraud—
the panelists will provide their business perspectives 
and also help us understand whether the private sector 
is able to do enough alone to contain fraud in a man-
ner that protects the payment system as a whole. The 
issue of the integrity of the payment system becomes 
more important each day, as electronic real-time pay-
ments supplant conventional paper instruments, depen-
dence on sophisticated technologies increases, and 
nonbanks come to play an increasingly important role 
as providers of payment services. Depending on the 
outcome of the debate, public policy institutions such 
as the Federal Reserve could come to play a more ac-
tive and interventionist role in the payment system as 
regulators and supervisors, and nonbanks could come 
more directly under the regulatory and supervisory 
purview of the authorities.21 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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